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Abstract
Cognitive reserve (CR) is understood as capacity to cope with challenging conditions, e.g. after brain injury or in states of
brain dysfunction, or age-related cognitive decline. CR in elderly subjects has attracted much research interest, but
differences between healthy older and younger subjects have not been addressed in detail hitherto. Usually, one-time
standard individual assessments are used to characterise CR. Here we observe CR as individual improvement in cognitive
performance (gain) in a complex testing-the-limits paradigm, the digit symbol substitution test (DSST), with 10 repeated
measurements, in 140 younger (20–30 yrs) and 140 older (57–74 yrs) healthy subjects. In addition, we assessed attention,
memory and executive function, and mood and personality traits as potential influence factors for CR. We found that both,
younger and older subjects showed significant gains, which were significantly correlated with speed of information
processing, verbal short-term memory and visual problem solving in the older group only. Gender, personality traits and
mood did not significantly influence gains in either group. Surprisingly about half of the older subjects performed at the
level of the younger group, suggesting that interindividual differences in CR are possibly age-independent. We propose that
these findings may also be understood as indication that one-time standard individual measurements do not allow
assessment of CR, and that the use of DSST in a testing-the-limits paradigm is a valuable assessment method for CR in
young and elderly subjects.
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Introduction
The concept of cognitive reserve (CR) has been designed to
describe and explain individual differences in susceptibility to
pathological changes in brain morphology in subjects suffering
from traumatic brain injury [1], and in elderly subjects with brain
atrophy [2,3]. In contrast to the traditional view, cognitive
performance in these elderly subjects was substantially better than
expected, indicating ‘‘some people to be more resilient to brain
changes than others’’ [4], p. 1006. Meanwhile the concept of CR
is widely accepted to explain the mismatch between expected and
observed cognitive capacities also in other pathological conditions,
e.g. cerebrovascular disease [5], Parkinson’s disease [6], white
matter disease [7] and multiple sclerosis [8], and is interpreted in
terms of ‘‘potential buffers between brain pathology and disease
outcome’’ [9], p. 122. Various factors contribute differently to CR,
e.g. linguistic ability [10], educational and occupational attain-
ment as well as leisure activities and lifelong experiences [4,11],
lifestyle including cognitively demanding activities [12], dietary
habits and regular physical exercise [13], and mentally beneficial
activities [14]. Motivation-related occupational abilities [15],
regular challenging cognitive activities as well as higher socioeco-
nomic status are associated with reduced risk of mild cognitive
impairment (MCI) and dementia [16]. However, as Satz et al. [9]
have pointed out, no construct validation has been proposed that
allows empirical testing of the role of the specific biological and
non-biological indicators of CR. In their hypothesized four-factor
model of CR capacity, general intelligence (‘‘g’’), complex mental
activity, processing resources, and executive functioning represent
the ‘‘potential reserve proxies’’, each with several specific
indicators. In combination with the hypothesised brain reserve
capacity model, this conceptual framework is undoubtedly an
important step forward because it allows empirical testing of the
significance and role of the different components and indicators.
However, CR is typically viewed as a more or less ‘mechanistic’
capacity, i.e. all indicators proposed so far represent either rather
static variables or reflect compensatory means for brain pathology,
both with undefined degree of modifiability and thus adaptability.
The use of brain morphology variables and/or (mental) proxy
measures, for example, education, occupation, leisure activities,
etc. as indicators of CR may be too ‘‘passive’’ in nature [3]. If one
accepts Stern’s view [3], that CR allows subjects to cope with
functional consequences of unfavourable functional brain alter-
ations ‘‘by using pre-existing cognitive processes or by enlisting
compensatory processes’’ (p.2016), then one would prefer a more
dynamic definition of CR. Jones et al. [17] pointed out, that CR
‘‘may be a potentially modifiable characteristic, for example
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through mental or physical exercise’’ (p. 599). The participation in
mentally stimulating activities is a highly robust correlate of CR
[18], indicating that regular practice of mental functioning is
supportive for maintaining cognitive performance [19]. However,
cognitive resources representing CR may not be fully activated in
routine task conditions, but are activated when required for
flexible and successful response to non-routine task conditions,
which imply mental challenges. The question then arises whether
a more dynamic type of assessment would be helpful to determine
CR in a more direct way by measuring the individual, differential
activation of CR when the subject is confronted with a cognitively
demanding challenge, and may thus be expected to ‘‘boost’’ CR
[17]. A particularly helpful methodological approach to assess CR
as understood here is the testing-the limits paradigm, i.e. the
measurement of potential boosting of performance after practice
with a cognitive task, because the ‘‘standard one-time-assessments
may not reflect the latent competence in the range of plasticity’’
[20], p. 351. This experimental approach has been found useful in
proofing the presence of latent cognitive capacities in elderly
subjects [21,22,23].
In the current study we were interested in proving the usefulness
of a complex cognitive task, the digit-symbol-coding test (also
known as digit symbol substitution test, DSST) for the assessment
of CR in a group of 140 younger (mean age: 23 yrs) and 140 older
healthy adults (mean age: 67 yrs). Performance in the DSST is
relatively unaffected by intelligence (g), memory, or learning
capacity ]24, pp. 368], but performance in this test was found to be
sufficiently sensitive for mental ageing independent of years of
education [25]. Expected individual improvements in performance
were assumed to indicate activation of individual resources for the
given complex cognitive challenge. Furthermore, we assessed
broader individual cognitive ability baseline, mood and personality
traits. The following main questions were addressed: (1) Is the
DSST a useful and robust testing-the-limits paradigm for assessing
CR in younger and older healthy subjects? (2) What are the
essential differences in the degree and temporal course of CR in
younger and older subjects, and in variability of practice effects
between and within the two groups? (3) Do one-time standard
individual assessments predict CR, i.e. do high-performing
subjects at baseline also show higher CR? (4) Which cognitive
(cognitive speed, working memory, cognitive flexibility and visual
problem solving) and non-cognitive factors (mood, personality
traits) influence CR? Research concerning the development of
fluid and crystallized intelligence in general has focused on
Openness to experience. The OFCI model proposed by Ziegler et
al. [26] shows that Openness has a direct positive effect on fluid
intelligence through environmental enrichment. Moreover, an
indirect effect for Openness on crystallized intelligence could also
be confirmed. Thus, personality traits such as Openness have been
shown to play a role in maintaining or improving cognitive ability.
Therefore, personality as a predictor of CR will also be focused on
in this study. For better differentiation and understanding, we use
the term ‘cognitive architecture’ to denote cognitive performance
in standard one-time assessments, without implying that the
cognitive functions in question belong to either fluid or crystallised
intelligence. In fact, our understanding of cognitive architecture is
based on the idea that cognitive performance per se relies
necessarily on the existence of cognitive functions and their
development during life as guided by experience, and is geared to
the model of Anderson et al. [27] with several modules, and their
interactions, involved in and subserving cognitive functioning. In
contrast, CR is defined here as the dynamic improvement in




This study was approved by the ethical committee of the
Medical Faculty at Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich.
Written consent was additionally obtained from all subjects. In
total, 298 younger and older healthy adults participated voluntar-
ily in this study. All participants had at least 13 years of education.
Younger subjects (n = 140; 100 female, 40 male, age: 20 to 30 yrs,
M = 22.81 yrs, SD = 2.41) were recruited mostly via flyers among
students from two large southern German universities. Ten
younger subjects were excluded because they were either already
familiar with the test material used (n = 5) or because of difficulties
with compliance (n = 5). Older subjects (n = 140; 66 females, 74
males; age: 57–74 yrs, M = 67.27, SD = 4.16) were recruited from
a larger sample (n = 148) of Senior University students. Eight older
subjects were not included in the study/data analysis, either
because of meeting exclusion criteria (health problems; n = 3), or
because of difficulties with compliance during testing (n = 5). 121
of the older participants had a University degree (18 years of
education) or doctoral degree (21 years of education).
Before entering in the study, a detailed telephone interview was
conducted with potential participants for screening of exclusion
criteria, in particular health problems (cardiac, metabolic, or
endocrine insufficiencies, neurologic or psychiatric disease) and
medication as well as non-correctable visual or auditory impair-
ments which could interfere with cognitive performance. Partic-
ipants were reminded to abstain from alcohol and medication that
might interfere with cognitive processes, as well as to abstain from
drinking coffee on the day of participation no later than one day
prior to the scheduled testing session.
Assessment of Cognitive Architecture
Cognitive architecture was assessed on the basis of standard-
one-time measurements of information processing/attention (digit
cancellation test d2; [28]), verbal short-term and working memory
(subtests for digit spans forward and backward; [29]), and visual
problem solving (Matrices of the WAIS-III; [30]).
Measurement of CR
Systematic practice effects were determined using the Digit
Symbol Substitution Test (DSST; [30]). The DSST is a paper and
pencil test. Participants are presented with nine symbols, each
representing one of nine (1–9) digits. A series of digits with a blank
space for sketching the symbol underneath is presented on the
same sheet of paper. Subjects are asked to assign as many symbols
as possible to the respective digits. The test was administered ten
times consecutively with exactly the same order of symbols. To
avoid ceiling effects, the time for each repetition was reduced to 90
seconds (standard: 120 seconds). Between repetitions, participants
were given a break of 1 min to prevent fatigue effects of the hand.
The number of correctly assigned and written symbols was used as
performance measure.
Other Measures
In addition to the cognitive tests, a socio-demographic interview
was carried out, which also included questions concerning physical
and mental health. Mood was assessed in the group of younger
subjects with the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating Scale
(MADRS; [31]), whereas for the older participants Beck’s
Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II; [32]) was used.
For the assessment of personality traits, the computerized German
version of the NEO-Five-Factor-Inventory (NEO-FFI; [33]) was
used in both groups.
Age-Dependent Cognitive Reserve
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The assessment of cognitive and non-cognitive variables and the
CR lasted approximately two hours. One psychologist and four
well trained and regularly supervised student assistants performed
the assessment. For the participation in the study participants
received 30 Euro as financial compensation after the assessment
was completed.
Data Analysis
Calculation of indexes of cognitive reserve. There is no
unequivocal definition of gain scores after practice trials
[34,35,36,37]. Williams and Zimmermann [34] have argued that
simple gain scores can be very useful in research. Thus we decided
to use two different measures of gain after systematic practice in
ten consecutive trials in the DSST as terms for CR: the raw gain
score defined as the difference between best performance (highest
number of correct items) and the performance in the first trial,
whereby the best trial was not necessarily the last trial. The second












This measure can be understood as the area under the curve of
the relativized gain function. The raw gain score is first divided by
the maximum gain score of the respective population and then
multiplied by the quotient of the baseline and maximum gain
score. This calculation method has several advantages. Ceiling
effects in improvement are relativized by compensating for the
baseline, comparability of CR measures is improved by including
the maximum gain score of the population, and complete
progression of the improvement function is taken into account
by utilizing the integral of the function. The output of the formula
is always 0 for the first trial, as it represents the baseline, then
increases (positive values) or decreases (negative values) with
relative increment or decrement in DSST performance. In the
following, this measure will be referred to as modified gain score.
Statistical analysis of data. All data were analysed using
IBMH SPSSH Statistics 20. Differences in baseline, raw gain,
modified gain scores and consistency measures were calculated
with independent-samples t-tests. To analyse differences between
trial numbers required to reach defined performance levels a
repeated-measures ANOVA (analysis of variance) was carried out.
Bivariate Pearson-product moment correlations were performed to
test relationships between modified gain scores and cognitive
architecture and personality traits, respectively. All reported p-
values are Bonferroni corrected.
Results
Cognitive Architecture
Table 1 shows age and gender, and outcome of cognitive
architecture assessment. The younger group of participants scored
significantly higher on the digit cancellation test
(t[271.47]) = 13.35, p,.0005, d = 1.59), digit spans forward (t
[278]) = 6.32, p,.0005, d = .75) and backward (t[268.94] = 6.11,
p,.0005, d = .73) and Matrices test (t[222.70]) = 11.34, p,.0005,
d = 1.35) than the older group.
Cognitive Reserve
Figure 1 shows the outcome of systematic practice with the
DSST over 10 trials. In both groups the increase in performance
was substantial with large within variations of practice effects (see
Figure 2). In the first trial, the younger group of subjects processed
correctly on average 67.01 (SD = 9.63) items; on average the best
performance in this group was 89.34 (SD = 13.67) correct items.
The older group of subjects processed on average 47.28
(SD = 9.36) items correctly in the first trial; their best average
performance was 63.74 (SD = 12.22) correct items. Thus, the raw
gain score in the younger group was 25.52 (SD = 10.10) and 18.94
(SD = 7.30) in the older group. The modified gain score was 1.72
(SD = .81) for the younger group, and 1.24 (SD = .59) for the older
group, respectively. Baseline scores and gain scores differed
significantly between groups (baseline: t [278] = 17.38, p,.0005,
d = 2.07; gain raw scores: t [278] = 6.26, p,.0005, d = .75;
modified gain scores: t [278] = 5.60, p,.0005, d = .67). Thus the
younger group shows significantly higher baseline scores as well as
significantly higher gains. The two measures of gain, the raw and
the modified gain scores, are highly significantly correlated with
each other (r = .95, p,001).
For a more detailed characterization of practice effects in the
two groups the number of trials was calculated that was required
to achieve a particular intraindividual level of performance. The
Table 1. Demographic description of the two subject groups
and outcomes in cognitive architecture.
Younger adults Older adults
Age 22.81 (62.41) 67.27 (64.16)
Gender 40 m, 100f 74 m, 66f
d2 201.68 (637.46) 146.07 (632.04)
DS forwards 8.77 (61.77) 7.49 (61.61)
DS backwards 8.94 (62.05) 6.56 (61.71)
SPM 21.81 (62.58) 16.88 (64.45)
Mean test scores and 61 standard deviation in brackets, age in years,
m = males, f = females, d2 = digit cancellation test, DS = digit spans,
SPM = Standard Progressive Matrices.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.t001
Figure 1. DSST raw scores of the younger and the older group
in 10 consecutive trials in the DSST. Note the difference in base
line performance between groups, but the similar increase in




PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 January 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 1 | e84590
younger group reached the 50 percent level of increase in DSST
performance on average after 4.46 trials (SD = 1.56), the older
group after 3.77 (SD = 1.35) trials. For statistical analysis, a
repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out with ‘group’ as first
factor and ‘mean trials’ required for achievement of 50, 75 and 90
percent of the respective performance level, as indicated by gain
raw scores, as the second factor. We found significant main effects
for group (F [1, 139] = 15.54, p,.0005, ) and number of trials (F
[2, 278] = 668.45, p,.0005), but no significant interaction
between the two factors (F [2, 278] = 1.55, p = .22). Post hoc tests
using the Bonferroni correction revealed that the differences
between the 50 and 75 percent (p,.0005) as well as between the
75 and 90 percent performance levels (p,.0005) were significant.
t-tests with Holm-Bonferroni correction showed significant differ-
ences between groups for the 50 percent (t[272.23] = 3.93,
p,.002, d = 47), 75 percent (t [278] = 3.46, p,.002, d = .41) and
90 percent performance levels (t[289.58] = 2.18, p,.03, d = .26).
Thus, interestingly, the younger group required significantly more
trials to achieve all performance levels.
Similarities between Groups
Apart from differences between groups, we were also interested
in similarities in performance characteristics, which became
evident by analyzing performance of younger adults with average
performance and identifying their counterparts in the ‘older’
group. For this purpose subjects from both age groups with a
modified gain score within the second and third quartiles of all
values (equal to all values from 1.09 to 2.21 in modified gain score;
see Figure 2) were selected. On this basis, 70 younger and 72 older
adults were included into the statistical analysis. There was only a
small, but not significant difference in modified gain score between
these two subgroups (t [140] = 1.65, p = .10, d = .20). In other
words, 72 older subjects (51.4%) performed at the same level as 70
(50%) younger subjects, but 48.60% of the older adults performed
at a lower level. It should be added, that neither in the younger
(r = -.12, p = .17) nor in the elder group (r = .09, p = .29) there is a
significant correlation between the baseline and the raw gain
scores.
Consistency of Gains
Intraindividual variability. Figure 3 shows examples for
intraindividual variability in performance in the DSST in 15
younger and 15 older randomly selected subjects. Interestingly,
some subjects show small variations in performance, while others
show rather high variability. One way of analyzing the consistency
of gains in the DSST in the two groups is to calculate and compare
performance deteriorations. For this purpose the frequency of
trials with lower correctly processed items compared with the
preceding trial was counted. In the younger group 2.43
(SD = 1.11) of such trials were found on average; the correspond-
ing rate in the older group was 2.49 (SD = 1.12) trials. The
difference between the groups is not significant (t [278] = .42,
p = .68, d = .05). West et al. [37] have proposed an alternative
possibility for investigating the inconsistency of performance:
deviations from individual performances are relativized by the
performance of the current trial to compensate for different levels
of performance, according to the formula:
Inconsistency~





On the basis of this formula the younger group showed a mean
inconsistency value of.34 (SD = .15), the older group of.36
(SD = .15); both measures do not differ significantly (t
[278] = .68, p = .50, d = .08; see Fig. 4).
Interindividual variability. Interindividual consistency in
performance was tested by means of Levene’s tests. Variability in
the DSST baseline performance did not differ significantly
between groups (F [278] = .02, p = .90). However, the variance
of the raw gain scores (F [278] = 13.96, p,.0005) and of the
modified gain scores (F [278] = 16.06, p = .0005) differed signif-
icantly between the two groups, with the younger subjects
exhibiting significantly larger gain differences with increasing
number of trials (see Figure 5).
Figure 2. Histogram of the raw (left) and modified gain scores (right) of the younger and older group. Note the large overlap in gain
scores for younger and older subjects in both gain measures.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.g002
Age-Dependent Cognitive Reserve
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Relationship between Cognitive Architecture and
Modified Gain Score
Correlations between the modified gain score and measures for
information processing/attention (d2), verbal short term (digit
span forward) and working memory (digit span backward), and
visual problem solving (SPM) were calculated. As can be seen in
Table 2, in the younger group no correlation was significant
(highest p = .14) and effect sizes were rather small (highest r = .15).
In the older group, information processing (r [138] = .35, p,.001),
verbal short term memory (r [138] = .20, p = .04) and visual
problem solving (r [138] = .19, p = .05) were significantly corre-
lated with the modified gain score. The correlations with verbal
short term memory and visual problem solving possess small to
medium effect sizes, and the correlation with information
processing a medium to large effect size.
Relationship between Personality Traits and Modified
Gain Score
To examine the relationship between CR and the Big Five
personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness to expe-
rience, Conscientiousness and Agreeableness) correlations with
power values were calculated (see Table 3). These correlations
reached neither in the younger nor in the older group significant
levels and showed relatively low effect sizes.
Figure 3. Exemplary performance curves of 10 consecutive trials in the DSST of 15 randomly selected younger subjects (left) and 15
randomly selected older subjects (right). Note differences in baseline and in interindividual performance variation in both groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.g003
Figure 4. Inconsistency values for DSST raw gain scores for the younger and the older group in the 2nd to 9th trial. Note the similar
inconsistency in all trials for both groups. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.g004
Age-Dependent Cognitive Reserve
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Relationship between Cognitive Architecture, Modified
Gain Score and Mood
We did not find significant correlations between mood scores
and measures of cognitive architecture or modified gain scores in
the DSST, neither for the Montgomery-Asberg Depression Rating
Scale in the younger group nor for the Beck’s Depression
Inventory in the older group (highest p = .35, highest r = 2.125).
Discussion
The main outcome of this study is that both, younger and older
subjects showed a significant increase in performance in the DSST
after systematic practice. Baseline performance and increase after
practice were, however, significantly higher in the younger group.
Furthermore, cognitive performance in traditional testing condi-
tions (i.e. one-time assessment), i.e. cognitive architecture, was also
significantly higher in the younger group for information
processing speed/attention, verbal short-term and working mem-
ory and visual problem solving. These results are in line with
reports suggesting the persistence of individual differences in
cognitive functioning rather than differential rates of age-
associated cognitive declines [38]. Interestingly, however, the
younger group required significantly more practice trials to
achieve 50, 75 and 90% performance relative to the individual
baseline. This resulted from the shallower learning curve of the
younger group. In the older group, gain was significantly
correlated with speed of information processing, verbal short-term
memory and visual problem solving; in contrast, no significant
correlations between measures of cognitive architecture and CR
gains were found in the younger group. Gender, personality traits
and mood did not significantly influence performance gains after
practice, which is in contrast to other reports [39,40,41]. This
difference in outcome may be explained by the homogeneity of
our groups concerning these variables, but may also only become
overt in a longitudinal study [42]. Apart from these significant
differences between younger and older subjects, some interesting
similarities were also found. About 50% of older subjects showed
the same gain in performance as younger subjects did. In addition,
consistency of increase in performance in consecutive practice
trials did not differ significantly between the two age groups,
indicating similar variability in both groups. However, the younger
group showed a significantly higher variability in DSST perfor-
mance compared with older subjects after the first few trials. This
may be explained in terms of higher diversity in performance or in
higher instability of performance in younger subjects. However,
for a more valid assessment of intraindividual variability,
longitudinal measures appear appropriate, which also consider
emotional diversity and variability of biological parameters, e.g.
cardiovascular and metabolic factors [42,43]. Apart from these
facts, empirical evidence from other studies supports our
observations of smaller variability in cognitive performance of
older adults, which has been interpreted in the context of age-
associated entropy or entropy states of the brain [44,45].
Our observations are consistent with earlier reports of
significant effects of age on DSST performance (e.g. [25]) and
on practice effects in healthy older subjects in cognitive tasks (e.g.
[21,23]). Furthermore, the results of this study are also in line with
earlier studies reporting significant differences in performance
increments between younger and older subjects [46,47]. However,
in contrast to the findings reported by Bherer et al. [48], we found
significant correlations of cognitive architecture measures and
improvement rates in DSST at least for the older group. Because
mean age and educational level of subjects in their study was
similar to our subjects, this difference in the outcome may be due
to the small number of subjects (n = 12 in each group) in their
study. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the complexity of
the task plays a significant role. Bherer et al. [48] used a dual-task
paradigm to assess practice effects, which consisted of auditory
frequency discrimination and a visual (letter) identification task. In
contrast, the DSST task comprises many different cognitive
components: visual discrimination/identification, information
processing speed, visual (and probably also verbal) working
memory, and executive functions (flexibility, monitoring), which
Figure 5. Interindividual variability in DSST raw gain scores for
the younger and the older group in the 2nd to 10th trial. Note
the similar gain in the first 4 trials and increasing differences in the later
trials. Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.g005
Table 2. Correlations between modified gain scores and
measures of cognitive architecture.
Younger Group Older Group
r p r p
d2 .09 .60 .35*** .00
DS forwards .15 .14 .20* .04
DS backwards .07 .87 .16 .13
SPM .15 .17 .19* .05
All p-values are Bonferroni corrected, * signals a significant correlation on the.05
level (1-tailed) *** signals a significant correlation on the.001 level (1-tailed),
r = correlation coefficient, p = p-values, d2 = digit cancellation test, DS = digit
spans, SPM = Standard Progressive Matrices.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.t002
Table 3. Correlations between modified gain scores and
personality traits.
Younger Group Older Group
r p r p
Neuroticism .10 .99 .14 .53
Extraversion 2.18 .16 2.11 .90
Openness .10 .99 2.01 .99
Agreeableness 2.16 .99 2.17 .25
Conscientiousness .07 .99 2.08 .99
All p-values are Bonferroni corrected, r = correlation coefficient, p = p-value,
note that no correlation is significant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084590.t003
Age-Dependent Cognitive Reserve
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have to interplay effectively to guarantee high performance and
performance increase, respectively, during practice. Thus, the
DSST may represent a rather complex cognitive multi-tasking
condition. Interestingly, the DSST is sensitive to even minimal
brain injury [49] regardless of the locus of injury [50] and is also
sensitive to dementia [51] and to risk of severe hypoglycemia in
type 2 diabetes [52], suggesting that impaired performance in this
test is indicative of global brain dysfunction, although the frontal
lobe may play an important role in this type of cognitive multi-
tasking [53]. Thus, the DSST is a useful mean to measure a
complex, multi-component mental operation, which may reflect
CR in a sufficiently appropriate and valid form. Activation of
resources underlying this complex cognitive operation by stan-
dardised systematic practice in a challenging task, as translated by
the DSST testing-the-limits paradigm, may thus represent a highly
potential CR proxy as proposed by Satz et al. [9]. This does not
imply, that neurobiological factors subsumed under the umbrella
term of ‘brain reserve’ and mental capacities per se [2] do not
represent proxies of CR, but they lack the essential attribute of
dynamics of CR, and thus cannot predict the outcome of
challenging CR. We would like to propose, therefore, to define
CR as the extent of improvement in cognitive performance in a
challenging task of the testing-the-limits type, after a sufficient
number of practice trials. The DSST appears a particularly
suitable instrument for the standardised assessment of CR.
In conclusion, older and highly educated healthy subjects do not
only possess a good level of cognitive architecture, but also retain
CR, which can be used for coping with challenging cognitive tasks.
This indicates that functional brain plasticity remains preserved
even in older age, provided that brain reserve is sufficiently
available. Cognitive architecture and CR appear, at least in our
sample, largely independent of mood and personality traits in
healthy younger and older individuals, but may play a significant
role in pathological conditions, e.g. depression [54] or brain
diseases, for example, Parkinson’ disease [6], white matter disease
[7], or multiple sclerosis [8]. The difference in cognitive
architecture and in CR in older as compared to younger healthy
subjects is not surprising and is in line with many studies on mental
ageing. However, what is surprising is that about half of our older
subjects performed at the level of the younger group, and vice
versa, i.e. a subgroup of younger subjects did not outperform the
‘high’ performers in the older group. This poses the interesting
question of age-independent interindividual differences in cogni-
tive architecture and probably also CR, suggesting that both are
possibly not so much a question of years of life but rather of age-
independent interindividual differences [55,56].
Biological (e.g. genetic diversity, structural and functional brain
efficiency) and non-biological factors (e.g. individual experiences,
environmental factors) contribute to cognitive differences in
humans irrespective of age [57]. In addition, there exist healthy
older adults showing only slow cognitive decline over many years
[58], indicating that cognitive architecture and its regular use in
terms of activation of CR demonstrate high stability. Of course, as
pointed out by Stern [2,3] and Satz et al. [9], a number of factors
may influence cognition and CR in a more favourable or
unfavourable fashion. Apart from mental components, i.e. the
absence of dementia and chronic medical states affecting CNS
function, life-long use of mental capacities [16,18,59] and good
mood [41,42] have been identified as key factors for prolonged
mental health in older ageing. A quantitative, dynamic measure-
ment of CR may help to proof mental health span in normal and
pathological conditions of the brain, irrespective of age. The use of
the DSST in a testing-the-limit paradigm seems a promising
approach to estimate individual cognitive resources in the context
of cognitive architecture, mood, and biological variables, e.g.
hormones and morphological and functional brain factors. Our
results also pose some caution on the interpretation of short-term
practice effects in both, younger and older subjects: the obtained
improvement in cognitive performance may be due to the
activation of CR rather than the result of a primary practice
effect in terms of learning. Nevertheless, our results are in support
of the notion that systematic repeated practice with challenging
cognitive tasks can improve cognitive performance irrespective of
age (e.g., [19]).
There are some limitations in our study which deserve further
research and clarification. Because all our subjects had at least 13
years of education and thus all belong to the category of high
education level, our data do not allow a conclusion of cognitive
architecture and CR, and possible interactions, in individuals with
low(er) education levels. Furthermore, it remains unclear, whether
CR represents a more general (‘g’) capacity, or is also functionally
specialized, which is suggested by the involvement of different
components of a central circuit for complex cognition as proposed
by Anderson et al. [27]. Additionally, our data do not allow
commenting on the upper limit of CR, i.e. subjects may still have
improved after ten trials. Finally, it would be of interest to know
the dynamics of the time course of CR, for example, how long CR
remains preserved once it has been activated, or whether it is
activated faster when assessed a day or a week after the first
activation.
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